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INVITED REVIEW 
Organ Procurement, Values and Public Policy 
RONALD P. HAMEL* 
ABSTRACT - Th_e success ~forgan transplants in recent years has created a shortage of transplantable cadaver 
organs. Voluntansm, ~he pnmary mode of organ procurement currently in use nationwide, appears to be no 
longer succes~ful. Pohcy_makers and others are examining alternatives to the current system, namely, presumed 
conse_nt (routme salvagmg) and required request. In this process, there is a danger in considering only the 
effectiveness of the means and neglecting the value and belief commitments that underlie them. These need to 
b~ br?ught to t~e surface beca~se they ultimately contribute toward shaping the moral character of society. In 
th1s hgh~, reqmred request m•ght be a preferable public policy option because it balances the values of 
volunta~1sm (au~on?my, individual rights, and charity) with those of presumed consent (community, social 
well-bemg, and JUStice). It also promises to be more effective than either of the other two alternatives. 
Introduction 
Organ transplantation is a phenomenon of just a little more 
than a quarter century. In the 36 years since Dr. David H ume of 
Boston performed the first modern kidney transplant using a 
cadaver organ, transplantation has become a procedure more 
frequently employed and increasingly successful. This has 
been due to important advances in recent years, namely, 
greater sophistication in surgical techniques, better methods 
of tissue typing, and the discovery of new immunosuppressive 
drugs such as cyclosporin. The latter has greatly increased the 
survival rate of transplant recipients. 
This success, however, is not without its problems. Chief 
among them is the procurement oftransplantable organs. Not 
only is there an existing gap between the need for organs and 
the available supply, but this gap is rapidly widening. Recent 
studies indicate that in 1982 there were only 2,500 organ 
donors in this country out of 20,000 potential candidates 
-young to middle-aged persons who have suffered brain 
death as the result of accident, drowning, gunshots to the 
head, and viral infection among other causes. Hence, only 
about 15% of the possible pool of donors make provisions for 
the use of their organs ( 1 ). Meanwhile, hundreds of people 
die each year awaiting transplants, and thousands of others do 
not receive the transplants that would greatly enhance their 
quality of life. 
The procurement of additional organs poses a serious and 
urgent public policy issue. The current mechanism for obtain-
ing transplantable organs, known as "voluntarism," was deve-
loped in the early days of transplantation and no longer 
appears to be effective. A number of alternatives -presumed 
consent and required request - have been and are continu-
ing to be considered by policymakers, health care providers, 
ethicists, and others. One of these, "required request," will 
probably come up before the 1987 Minnesota legislature. 
Several states - California, Oregon, and New York among 
them - have already opted for this approach. If more and 
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more states follow suit, a new public policy for the procure-
ment of cadaver organs will have emerged. 
In considering which procedure to pursue, lawmakers and 
other participants in the debate need to realize that the issue 
in question is not only one of efficiency and effectiveness. The 
only concern is not and cannot be increasing the number of 
organs for transplant, though this would certainly appear to be 
the sole or, if not the sole, at least the dominant issue. In the 
humanitarian concern to save and improve life and in the 
fascination with and confidence in such technological devel-
opments, society could be swept away by a pragmatic concern 
for what works. Policy shapers at all levels could neglect the 
larger and more nebulous questions of meaning and how 
choices about what to do shape the kinds of persons and the 
kinds of communities that individuals and societies become. 
Achievements in medicine challenge society not only techno-
logically, but also humanly. The choices to be made are not 
only about technological progress, but also about human 
development. 
This is so because underlying the procedural considera-
tions in the retrieval of organs are considerations about basic 
values such as autonomy, justice, and charity as well as some 
basic beliefs about the relation of the individual to society, the 
treatment of the newly dead, the importance of the human 
body, the responsibilities of family members for a deceased 
~ndividual, the obligation to save life and to pursue technolog-
Ical progress. Implicitly or explicitly, these factors are an 
intrinsic part of public policy choices in the matter of organ 
procurement. 
There are at least two levels, therefore, to decisions about 
how to increase the supply of cadaver organs - the practical 
level dealing with the most effective mechanism, and the 
theoretical or meaning level dealing with the values and 
beliefs that society commits itself to in opting for a particular 
procedure. Both are the concern of this paper. I intend to 
examine the three dominant policy options- voluntarism, 
presumed consent, and required request - in terms of 1) 
their workability and effectiveness, and 2) the underlying 
assumptions of each, and attempt to argue for the preferability 
of required request at both levels. 
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Social Policy Options for Organ Procurement 
Voluntarism 
As previously noted, the primary mode of organ retrieval 
presently in use nationwide is "voluntarism." This procedure 
consists in an individual's making provision while alive for the 
donation of one or more organs if and when brain-death has 
been determined, or a family's giving consent for donation in 
the absence of such provision. In the first case, the prospective 
donor's decision is communicated either through a donor 
card, or by an appropriate indication on a driver's license, or 
both. In the latter case, next of kin may either come forward to 
donate organs or be approached by hospital personnel to do 
so. 
This mechanism emerged in the late 1960s, the early days of 
organ transplantation. Once cornea transplants began to be 
performed in the 1950s, states found it necessary to enact 
legislation providing for the possibility of individuals donat-
ing all or part of their bodies to medicine. By 1965, most states 
had some legal provision in place, but these differed from 
state to state. Some had no mechanism whatsoever. In the 
interests of uniformity, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968. It was adopted by all states and the 
District of Columbia by 1971. 
The Act, based on individual freedom and autonomous 
choice, contained several provisions (2). The two major ones 
-personal voluntary donation and next-of-kin donation-
were noted above. In addition, the Act recognized a donor 
card as a valid legal document when witnessed by two people. 
This, in effect, means that the wishes of the decedent take 
precedence over those of the family, and that health care 
personnel who comply with it are not subject to litigation. In 
those cases where the decedent has expressed no intentions, 
the Act established a clear order of priority for next-of-kin 
consent as well as a mechanism for obtaining that consent (a 
written message, telegram, or recorded telephone message). 
This method of organ procurement seems not to be work-
ing. Critics offer several explanations ( 1, 3 ). First, the majority 
of Americans have not indicated their wishes regarding organ 
donation. This does not seem to indicate a reluctance to 
donate (a 1983 Gallup poll found that 70% of Americans are 
willing) as much as it does a lack of initiative in taking the 
appropriate steps, or a lack of awareness about how to do so. 
The majority of the population never comes into contact with 
the donor card. It is estimated that only 20% of the population 
have signed cards and only 3% are carrying them at the time 
they are pronounced brain dead. States differ in how they use 
the driver's license for organ donation. Some provide a check-
off box, others stamp "organ donor" on the license, and yet 
others attach donor cards to the licenses. In any case, no state 
has more than a 20% positive indication. 
Second, even though an individual may have signed a 
donor card or have made the appropriate indication on a 
driver's license, the donor card and/or license might not be 
sought or found by medical personnel. Medical personnel, in 
turn, might or might not inquire of next of kin whether this 
particular individual is known to be an organ donor. Here the 
fault lies with health care providers. Some may simply lack 
initiative, or interest in organ transplantation, while others 
may be inadvertent to the opportunity for retrieving organs or 
the mechanisms for doing so, while yet others may recoil from 
the situation for psychological reasons ( 4) or because of 
discomfort in approaching family at a time of extreme crisis. 
Third, even though it may be clear that an individual is an 
organ donor, hospital personnel will almost always request 
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permission from the next of kin, even though this is unneces-
sary according to the UAGA. Physicians and nurses do this to 
respect the family's quasi-property rights over the body and 
their wishes regarding donation, as well as to avoid bad 
publicity and the possibility of future litigation. Rarely if ever 
are family wishes overturned even though they might contra-
dict the previously expressed desires of the decedent. Hence, 
in effect, donor cards serve only to sensitize people to the 
possibility of organ donation and to convey to families the 
wishes of a now deceased member. 
These are the pragmatic procedural considerations. They 
deal with what does or does not work. But what are the value 
questions associated with voluntarism? What are the assump-
tions and convictions underlying this particular public policy 
option? 
Blair and Alfred Sadler,Jr., very strong proponents of volun-
tarism, argue that the current system strikes a balance between 
individual values and rights, and the possibility of donating 
and obtaining organs (5, 6). That is to say, it provides a mode 
of organ procurement while at the same time respects indi-
vidual freedom of choice, freedom of religion, and the right to 
privacy, as well as the personal and aesthetic interests of the 
family, and encourages public support for and involvement in 
transplantation efforts. Voluntarism allows the individual to 
decide about the disposition of his or her body after death and 
protects the family's quasi-property rights over the body. 
Equally, if not more important, it maintains the "gift" character 
of organ donation. 
Another advocate of voluntarism, Paul Ramsey, proposed 
two reasons for what he called "organized giving" in his 1970 
book, The Patient As Person (7). The first centers on people's 
religious or nonreligious convictions about the body that 
might incline them to not want to donate. These individuals 
should not have to fight a system that might infringe on these 
beliefs and choices in a time of crisis. The second and perhaps 
more important reason is the impact of "giving" rather than 
"taking" upon the human community. A routine taking of 
organs not only would deprive individuals of an opportunity 
to exercise the virtue of generosity, it would also not contrib-
ute to the fostering and strengthening of "consensual com-
munity." According to Ramsey, responding to the need for 
gifts by giving has a civilizing effect and "meets the measure of 
authentic community." In effect, he cautions against a utilitar-
ian mentality in the service of medical progress and even 
saving lives that fails to recognize other crucial and even more 
basic considerations. 
William E. May, a Protestant ethicist, in many respects 
echoes Ramsey's views ( 8 ). He too believes that voluntarism 
is an expression of"self-donative love," a form of"assistance 
that one mortal renders another," and that such giving will 
have a positive influence on the quality of the community. He 
is also concerned about the body. For May, the corpse should 
enjoy a kind of "extra-territoriality," that is to say, it does not 
belong without limit to society. The state does not have an 
unlimited claim upon the person whether living or dead. In 
fact, traditionally, society has recognized "quasi-property 
rights" to the corpse in the next of kin. While these property 
rights do not extend to a commercial use of the corpse, they 
do allow the family to possess the body and to carry out its 
right and obligation to attend to the corpse's disposition. 
Normally, no other entity can put claims upon the body that 
would interfere with this right. And, certainly, the family 
should not have to claim the body as its possession. Such 
would seem to be the case with a policy of rountine salvaging 
of organs. 
Advocates of voluntarism, therefore, in addition to their 
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belief that it is an adequate mechanism, also see it as uphold-
ing the "gift" character of organ donation, as a schooling in the 
virtue of generosity, as an affirmation of individual free choice 
and particular rights, and as a protection against an excessive 
claim of the state upon the individual. They tend to come 
down on the side of individualism. 
Presumed Consent 
A second public policy alternative for the retrieval of trans-
plantable organs is what is known as "presumed consent" or 
"routine salvaging." It has been proposed by a number of 
individuals for adoption in the United States in place of the 
current system. Presumed consent is now employed in a 
number of European nations including Austria, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Israel, Poland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. 
Under presumed consent, it is assumed that individuals are 
in fact willing to donate their organs when death has been 
determined. Given appropriate circumstances (brain death, 
proper age, healthy organs, etc.), organs and tissues will rou-
tinely be harvested unless there has been a prior objection 
registered either by the individual or by next of kin. Hence, 
the burden here is shifted from the medical personnel to 
obtain consent to the individual or family to refuse it. In the 
absence of objections, the individual is considered a potential 
donor (9). 
Indications are that presumed consent has not been partic-
ularly effective in resolving the shortage of transplantable 
organs in those countries in which it is being employed. In 
part, this seems to be due to the fact that physicians in these 
countries do not remove organs without the prior consent of 
next of kin even though this is not legally required. Some 
families refuse, while in other cases physicians are reluctant to 
aproach family members at all with the request. Supporters of 
this alternative argue that were it to be employed as it should 
be, it would be effective. 
Why a policy of presumed consent, beyond the practical 
hope that it will ameliorate the shortage of organs for 
transplant? 
In a recent article, Kevin O'Rourke and Philip Boyle argue 
for presumed consent on the basis of justice, more specifi-
cally, legal or general justice ( 10, 11 ). As members of a com-
munity, citizens have an obligation in justice to contribute to 
the good of the community. Because the life and health of 
individuals contribute to the overall well-being ofthe society, 
O'Rourke and Boyle argue that there is some obligation in 
justice to be willing to give one's organs after death. Commun-
ity interests in this proposal would seem to take some priority 
over individual and familial interests and rights. 
Arthur Caplan, recently appointed Director of the Center for 
Bioethics at the University of Minnesota, though he himself 
does not espouse presumed consent, does suggest a possible 
further justification in the principle of beneficence (3). In 
contrast to the principle of nonmaleficence which requires 
that harm not be done to others, beneficence means that we 
ought to do good to others. The question arises in the applica-
tion of this principle: How much good does one have a duty to 
perform? Are there limits to what one must do for another? 
These types of questions have normally been answered in this 
way. People have a duty to benefit others when the expected 
benefit is significant, when it is likely to occur, and when it is 
of little or no risk or harm to the individual. In the case of 
organ donation, there is no suffering, pain, or harm for the 
deceased. Significant benefit will come to the recipient, and 
there is a high likelihood of its coming about. Therefore, some 
would suggest that there is even a moral duty to donate one's 
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organs. Routine harvesting simply assumes that one would 
want to fulfill one's duty to others who are in need, who can 
benefit. A life can be saved or the living of a life can be 
improved at no cost to the donor. 
Why do the critics of presumed consent oppose it? We 
return here to Ramsey and May. Neither sees this particular 
option to be ethically unacceptable. Rather they view it as 
undesirable at the level of underlying meanings. 
Ramsey laments the shift from "giving" to "taking." One can 
no longer speak of organ "donation" because the "giving" of 
organs would really result from a failure to positively refuse 
the gift. Furthermore, presumed consent violates the "sacred 
trust" of the family for the body of the deceased expressed in 
the quasi-property rights discussed above. What social inter-
ests override this sacred trust? Is the need for organs to be 
included with other exceptions such as autopsies in criminal 
investigations or in cases of communicable disease? These 
quasi-property rights, according to Ramsey, are based not only 
on positive law, but on a deeper sense of "familial duties and 
sacred trusts arising out of our common humanity." 
May is likeminded in this critique of routine salvaging. He 
raises two objections. First, he notes that many people have an 
aversion to the notion of routine salvaging, an aversion that 
should not be ignored even for laudable goals. He does not 
believe that perceptions of social need should override all 
other considerations or that the means for obtaining organs 
should become "everyday, routine, and casual." Second, May 
is concerned about the possible impact of this mechanism 
upon society's image of the hospital. What has traditionally 
been perceived as a place of healing and recuperation could, 
with routine harvesting, be seen as a "devourer." In the hospi-
tal, one's very vitals are devoured by the state on behalf of the 
social order. The consumption that dominates society is now 
consummated in the health care institution. All of this could 
weaken the trust that is the basis of the healing art. 
Two other objections have been raised to presumed con-
sent, but in its more extreme form, sometimes called "strong 
presumed consent." Here, organs are routinely retrieved 
regardless of objections to the contrary. Such a policy accord-
ing to Blair and Alfred Sadler, raises constitutional issues. It 
would seem, in the first place, to violate the First Amendment 
to the Constitution if it prevented a person who believed that 
his faith required him to be buried intact from freely exercis-
ing this religious belief. Those justifying this approach would 
need to show that there was both an overriding public need 
for organs and no other way to obtain an adequate supply. In 
the second place, there might also be possibility of a violation 
of the 14th Amendment in depriving an individual or next of 
kin control over disposition ofthe corpse after death, a possi-
ble violation of due process. Again, overriding this right would 
depend on there being a lifesaving need and no other 
alternatives. 
Required Request 
There is yet a third possible policy option for the procure-
ment of organs. it has been termed "required request" by 
Arthur Caplan, who is one of its major proponents (3). 
Under required request, a properly trained hospital repre-
sentative would be obliged to approach the family of all 
potential donors at the time of death. In those cases where an 
individual has signed a donor card or has some other written 
designation of intent, this system would ensure that medical 
personnel or next of kin attempt to locate it. If there is no such 
indication, and for the majority of Americans there probably 
would not be, then family would have to be asked for permis-
sion to retrieve organs. 
5 
Clearly, responsibility for obtaining organs is placed upon 
hospital personnel. In order to ensure compliance with a 
required request statute, a form would need to be completed 
in each case ascertaining that the request had been made, and 
this form would later be attached to the death certificate. A 
required request statute, which ideally would be enacted in 
every state, would allow for exceptions if it were believed that 
approaching a particular family would be harmful to them. 
This, too, would have to be put in writing. 
Why this approach? In the first place, it respects the au-
tonomy of the individual and of the family, as well as the 
quasi-property rights of the latter. Furthermore, since it is the 
next of kin who have responsibility for the disposition of the 
body, it would not seem to be an undue burden to inquire of 
them about a use of the body prior to disposition. Secondly, it 
involves next of kin in the process of organ procurement. 
Although the circumstances in which the request is made are 
stressful, most families will consent when asked and most will 
find it therapeutic. Thirdly, this mechanism maintains the 
"gift" character of donation and, by not making procurement 
routine, it protects somewhat against developing a "spare· 
parts" mentality. Fourthly, it seems to recognize a mild duty in 
justice to make the gift of one's organs. While it does not 
require this exercise of justice, it does seem to imply that 
donating one's organs for the good of society is perhaps 
something that one should do, and so next of kin will be asked 
to do so. Fifthly, it places the burden of organ procurement on 
the medical profession where it in fact belongs. If transplan· 
tors and transplant programs wish more cadaver organs, it is 
they who should take the initiative to obtain them. 
If it is the case that the majority of people in this country are 
willing to be donors but no one bothers to ask them to donate, 
then required request seems to make some sense. The draw-
back, of course, is in approaching family members in a time of 
extreme crisis. However, a policy of required request, if suffi-
ciently publicized and accompanied by educational strate· 
gies, could generate discussion of organ donation among 
family members, allowing for personal wishes to be known, 
and create the expectation that requests will be made in cases 
of brain death. To some degree this might reduce the element 
of surprise, awkwardness, and stress. Required request has 
been successful where it has been employed. 
Conclusion 
Three public policy options for the procurement of trans-
plantable organs and tissues have been considered as a possi-
ble means for resolving or at least alleviating the current 
shortage. Each has much to be said for and against it. If one 
were to consider only the end result - an increase in the 
number of available organs - one might be inclined to opt 
for a form of compulsory retrieval. However, if one takes 
account of the value dimensions of that alternative, it would 
become relatively clear that it tends toward a communitarian, 
even a utilitarian, emphasis. Such a direction is not without its 
problems, particularly when the major issues in medical 
ethics are becoming less individually focused and more socie-
tally focused. In pursuing the good of society as a whole or the 
good of the greatest number, there is danger of riding rough· 
shod over the individual. In the extreme, this approach will 
sacrifice the one for the good of the whole or the many. 
Opting for presumed consent nationwide may appear to be of 
minor significance in the much broader picture ofbioethical 
choices and policies, and of even less significance in the 
whole range of societal decisions. But society's commitment 
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to this mechanism would also be a commitment to certain 
values and beliefs. It would be part of a pattern that shapes the 
kind of people we are and become. 
On the other hand, voluntarism tends perhaps too much to 
the side of individualism. Ours is an age of individualism, an 
individualism that frequently takes the form of an assertion of 
personal rights that actually translates into the pursuit of one's 
interests and desires unhindered. One of the dangers here, as 
Robert Bellah points out in Habits of the Heart (12), is a 
forgetfulness of community, a loss of the sense of the com-
mon good and of our responsibilities as members of society to 
contribute to the well-being of the whole. The emphasis on 
freedom, autonomy, self-determination, and individual rights, 
taken to excess, can undermine social life. 
Both presumed consent and voluntarism reflect and pro-
mote crucial, though different, values and beliefs. It may be 
that required request, at least to some degree, blends and 
balances the commitments inherent in the other two alterna-
tives. It respects individual autonomy and rights while work-
ing toward the good of society. It promotes free giving, while 
perhaps suggesting a mild duty in justice to meet the need of 
others by giving one's organs. For this reason, it may be a 
preferable public policy option. 
There is undoubtedly good reason to be concerned about 
the need for transplantable organs, but there is also good 
reason to be at least as concerned about the means employed 
in obtaining them. As Willard Gay lin, president ofthe Hastings 
Center, has said so well: "Sustaining life is an urgent argument 
for any measure, but not if that measure destroys those very 
qualities that make life worth sustaining." ( 13). 
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